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RECENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DECISIONS
Washington: Character of Federal Savings Bonds Purchased
with Community Funds. In re Allen's Estate1 involved a dispute over
the separate or community nature of federal savings bonds. H was
the registered owner of Series E, U. S. Savings Bonds which he had
purchased during marriage with community funds, naming W as beneficiary. Washington community property law provides that all property acquired during marriage except by gift, devise or descent belongs
to the community On the other hand, the federal treasury regulations
provide that the registration of savings bonds shall be conclusive evidence of ownership.' W having predeceased H, a conflict arose as to
the community or separate status of the bonds. The case came up on
appeal from a trial court order requiring H, as administrator of W's
estate, to inventory the bonds as community property. The Washington Supreme Court held that the character of ownership was to be
determined under the community property law of the state, rejecting
the husband's contention that, as registered owner, the bonds were his
separate property under the treasury regulations. In so holding, the
court found: (1) the regulations were for the government's convenience and to to avoid numerous transfers but that the United States
had no concern to whom the money belonged after the bonds were
1 154 Wash. Dec. 748, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
2 RCW 26.16.010 and RCW 26.16.020 define separate property as property owned
before marriage and that acquired after marriage by gift, devise, or descent, and the
rents, issues and profits thereof. RCW 26.16.030 provides that, with the exception of
the above statutes, all property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife or
both, is community property. California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman, 29
Wn.2d 98, 185 P.2d 494 (1947) ; Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn.2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947);
In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945).
3 "United States Savings Bonds are issued only in registered form. The form of
registration used must express the actual ownership of and interest in the bond and,
except as otherwise specifically provided in Subpart E and § 315.48 of Subpart I of
this part, will be considered as conclusive of such ownership and interest." 31 Code of
Federal Regulations, Money & Finance: Treasury, chapter 2, § 315.5, p. 472.
"Savings bonds are not transferable and are payable only to the owners named
thereon, except as specifically provided in the regulations in this part and then only in
the manner and to the extent so provided ..
" 31 Code of Federal Regulations,
Money & Finance: Treasury, chapter 2, § 315.15, p. 477.
4 "If either co-owner of United States savings bonds registered in two names as
co-owners (in the alternative) dies without having presented and surrendered the bond
for payment to a federal reserve bank or the treasury department, the surviving
co-owner will be the sole and absolute owner of the bond." RCW 11.04.230.
"If the registered owner of United States savings bonds registered in the name of
one person payable on death to another dies without having presented and surrendered
the bond for payment or authorized reissue to a federal reserve bank or the treasury
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paid; (2) as the Washington statutes' providing for sole and absolute
ownership in the surviving co-owner or beneficiary of U. S. Savings
bonds do not cover a situation where the beneficiary predeceased the
registered owner, ownership was to be determined under state community property law; (3) the bonds, being purchased with community
funds, were community property; otherwise a designing spouse could
transfer community into separate property through their purchase.
The federal treasury regulations referring to ownership of Series E,
U. S. Savings Bonds have been subjected to varying interpretations in
state courts. Some courts hold that they set up absolute property
rights which supersede state property laws under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution.' These rights are set up as an inducement to
purchasers under the borrowing power of the federal government and
are to be applied with uniformity throughout the states under congressional mandate. This approach was seemingly adopted by the
Texas court in Ricks v. Smith,' which involved co-ownership bonds
purchased by the husband with community funds. Upon his death the
wife as registered co-owner claimed the bonds as her separate property under the survivorship provisions of the federal regulations. It
was held that the wife was sole owner, irrespective of Texas community
property law.7
Other courts reject the property approach but treat the regulations
as inherent provisions of a contract between the purchaser and the
federal government.8 Recognizing that Congress, under the borowing
department, and is survived by the beneficiary, the beneficiary will be the sole and
absolute owner of the bond." RCW 11.04.240.
5 An example of this type of reasoning is that espoused by the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S.655 (1950), which involved interpretation of the National Service Life Insurance Act providing that the insured has the
right to designate the beneficiary of the policy, and that no person should have a vested
right in the proceeds of the policy. 38 U.S.C. § 802(g), (i) (1946). The court held that
the named beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds on the basis of the supremacy of
federal law despite the wife's claim that she was entitled to a one half interest therein as
owner due to the fact that her deceased husband purchased the policy with community
funds. See Note, 26 WAsH. L. REv.61 (1951). Although the decision is of some argumentative value in the savings bond area, the case is readily distinguishable due to the
different nature of the NSLI policy and statutory language governing its ownership.
6 318 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1958) ; Noted in 37 TEXAS L. Rav. 770 (1959).
7"To give supremacy to Federal regulations no more affects community property law
than laws of descent and distribution." Supra note 6 at 442. In the later case of Hilley
v. Hilley, 327 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. 1959), the Texas court expressly limited the
holding in the Ricks case to government savings bonds cases involving the supremacy
of federal law. Thus, it was held that securities purchased with community funds and
issued to H and W "as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in
common," at the instruction of the husband in the wife's presence, did not entitle the
wife
to sole ownership thereof on the husband's death.
8
Hinson v. Plowden, 91 F. Supp. 836 (1950 D.C.S.C.) ; Conrad v. Conrad, 66 Cal.
App2d 280, 152 P.2d 221 (1944) ; Erwin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402 (1945).
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power, may regulate and adjust contracts so that property might be
subject to succession by survivorship, those courts treat the bonds as
insurance contracts which provide a valid will substitute but do not
necessarily change the initial character of ownership. Thus the beneficiary or surviving co-owner may not be deprived of his contractural
right on the basis of state Statute of Wills provisions or gift law.
The third approach, and that apparently accepted by the Washington court in the Allen case, interprets the regulations as having been
passed merely for the administrative convenience of the federal government in dealing with claims arising under the bonds, but in no
way intending to change state law in respect to the creation of property
rights.' This interpretation was adopted by the Louisiana court in the
case of Slater v. Culpepper"° which involved co-ownership bonds purchased by the wife with community funds at a time when the husband
was physically incapacitated. The husband, having survived the wife,
claimed the bonds as surviving co-owner under the treasury regulations. The court held the bonds to be community property, finding no
intent on the part of the purchasing wife to employ the bonds as a
method of disposing of her community interest upon death, and stating
that any other conclusion "would greatly endanger the recognized
right of the wife to make a disposition by testament of her vested one
half interest in the community property."'" In arriving at its decision
in the Allen case, the Washington court examined the approaches taken
in the Slater and Ricks cases respecting the impact of the federal regulations on state community property law, and approved the interpretation of the Louisiana court while rejecting the supremacy argument
set forth in the Texas opinion.
The proposition stated by the Louisiana court, to the effect that the
regulations were merely for the convenience of the United States in
making payments, was not new to Washington. The problem of interpreting the treasury regulations was before the court in the case of
Decker v. Fowler,2 in which the named beneficiary of U. S. Savings
Bonds claimed the proceeds upon the death of the registered owner.
The court held that since the regulations were merely for the government's convenience in making payments, the designation of benefici9 In re GLADNEY, 233 La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953) ; Gladieux v. Parney, 93 Ohio
App. 117, 106 N.E.2d 317 (1951) ; Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 56, 293 N.W. 841 (1940).
10 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953) ; See 37 A.L.R.2d 1216 for a review of the
Slater case as well as other cases involving the interpretation of federal savings bonds
regulations.

11 Slater v. Culpepper, supra note 10.
12 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939).
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aries constituted an ineffective gift transfer in violation of the state
Statute of Wills. The decision was out of line with the "majority
rule" to the effect that the bonds constituted a contract between the
purchaser and the federal government, the regulations being inherent
provisions creating contract rights in the third party beneficiary."3
To abrogate the holding in the Decker case, the legislature enacted
RCW 11.04.230'- providing that the surviving co-owner of U. S. Savings bonds shall be sole and absolute owner, and RCW 11.04.240"
providing that upon the death of the registered owner of beneficiary
bonds, the beneficiary will be sole and absolute owner. Since the statutes did not cover the particular problem in the Allen case, in which
the beneficiary predeceased the registered owner, we are still confronted with the question of the impact of our two statutes on community property rights. The conflict would be best illustrated in a
case where H purchased bonds with community funds and named a
stranger to the community as co-owner or beneficiary. The wife should
be able to get part of the proceeds from the named co-owner or beneficiary stranger to avoid being fraudulently deprived of community
funds by the purchasing spouse. 6 The obvious intent of the Washington statutes was to override the holding in the Decker case that the
use of beneficiary bonds was ineffective as a will substitute. The question of the impact, on community property incidents of ownership, of
the statutory provisions for sole and absolute ownership in the surviving co-owner or beneficiary was probably not considered by the
legislature. The statutes probably would not preclude the imposition
of a constructive trust, at least to the extent of the wife's community
interest therein, on the survivor or beneficiary stranger.'
Turning now to the situation where H and W are named as parties
to the bonds, the possible effect of the statutes is far from clear. U. S.
' 3 See Comment, Donee Beneficiaries-Decker v. Fowler, 14 WAsH. L.
(1939).
14 Supra note 4.
Is Supra note 4.
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"6Even courts adopting the Supremacy approach hold that the proceeds may be
pursued in cases of fraud or inequitable conduct See Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp.
765, (D.C. Neb. 1953); Henderson's Adm'r v. Bewley, 264 S.W2d 680 (Ky. 1953);
Chase v. Leiter 96 Cal. App.2d 439, 215 P.2d 756 (1950).
17 In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27, 114 A.L.R. 531
(1937), the wife was able to set aside in toto, her deceased husband's designation of a
stranger beneficiary in a life insurance policy on the grounds that such a designation
constituted an attempt to make a gift of community property without the consent of the
wife. See Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REv. 640
(1955). In view of the statutory provisions upholding ownership in the survivor in
savings bonds cases, the wife's recovery will probably be limited to recouping her one
half of the community share.
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Savings Bonds come in both co-ownership and beneficiary varieties.
Under Washington community property law, each spouse is entitled
to dispose of his half of the community estate upon his death." (1) In
the case of beneficiary bonds, the surviving non-purchasing spouse
should be entitled to the proceeds, the purchaser's testamentary intent
being inferred from the designation of the surviving spouse as beneficiary.' As indicated in the Allen case, this rationale should in no
way affect the community character of the bonds prior to the death
of the registered owner, unless it can be shown that a change in the
initial character of the property was agreed to by the non-purchasing
spouse.' ° The Allen case held that when the bonds were acquired by
H with community funds they belonged to the community. (2) In
the case of co-ownership bonds, the intent of the purchasing co-owner
to dispose of his community interest upon death is not so easily inferred. Both the Slater" and Rick" cases involved surviving co-owners
claiming as their separate property bonds purchased by the deceased
spouse with community funds. In the Slater case, the Louisiana court
found no testamentary intent implicit in the purchase of bonds in
co-ownership form, and, finding no express agreement between the
spouses to follow the survivorship provisions, held that the treasury
regulations were for the government's convenience and not designed
to deprive the deceased spouse of her community interest. As was
pointed out above, the Washington court in the Allen case adopted
the Louisiana view and rejected the Texas holding, in favor of the
survivor, that the federal regulations were supreme. However, should
a case arise in Washington involving the claim of the surviving nonpurchasing spouse of co-ownership bonds, it is doubtful that the Slater
case will be apposite, since it involved merely the interpretation of
the treasury regulations, the Louisiana court not being confronted
with a statute such as RCW 11.04.230."3 It is clear that the Washington statutes regarding savings bonds were not enacted for the convenience of the federal government in making payments, but this is
not tantamount to saying that they were intended to change the initial
18 RCW 11.04.050; RCW 26.16.030.
19 Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952) ; Succession of Greagan,
212 La. 574, 33 So. 2d 118 (1947).
20 The spouses may by agreement transmute community into separate property.
RCW 26.16.050.
21 Supra note 10.
22 Supra note 6.
23

Supra note 4.
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character of ownership of the obligation. Their passage, following the
decision in the Decker case, was obviously intended to recognize
savings bonds as a valid will substitute and to give validity to the
survivorship provisions.
It is to be pointed out that the statutes do not purport to deal with
the initial character of ownership of the bonds, but only with their
disposition upon the death of one of the parties thereto. Although one
spouse cannot unilaterally transmut community into jointly held property, he may unilaterally dispose of his one half of the community
interest upon his death. Thus, focussing on the contractural rather
than the proprietary nature of U. S. Savings Bonds, the survivorship
provisions of the Washington statutes may result in conclusively inferring the requisite testamentary intent in the deceased co-owner in
favor of the surviving non-purchasing spouse. The same presumption
would of course operate in the beneficiary bond area in favor of the
non-purchasing spouse designated as beneficiary. Such a holding
would in no way change the community nature of the bonds prior to
the death of the purchasing spouse.
In summary, under the above analysis, where U. S. Savings Bonds
are purchased with community funds, the possible factual situations
that may arise and their probable disposition will be as follows:
Beneficiary Bonds. (1) Upon the death of the purchasing spouse,
the surviving beneficiary spouse will take as sole and absolute owner.
(2) Where the purchasing spouse names a stranger as beneficiary, the
surviving spouse should be able to impose a constructive trust on the
beneficiary for an amount equal to one half of the proceeds. (3) Where
the purchasing spouse survives the beneficiary, the bonds will retain
their community character. (4) Where the non-purchasing spouse is
designated as registered owner and predeceases the purchaser beneficiary, a constructive trust of one half the proceeds may be imposed
in favor of the estate of the deceased spouse in the absence of showing
an agreement to follow the survivorship provisions.
Co-ownership Bonds. (1) Where the spouses are named as coowners, the surviving non-purchasing spouse will take as sole owner.
(2) Where the non-purchasing spouse predeceases the purchaser, a
constructive trust of a one-half interest will be imposed in favor of
the deceased's estate absent the showing of an agreement to the contrary. (3) Where a stranger to the community is named as co-owner,
the non-purchasing spouse will be entitled to impose a constructive
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trust on the surviving stranger for a one-half interest therein. (4) Coownership bonds purchased with community funds will retain their
community character in absence of an agreement between the spouses
to change the character of ownership.
TONI C. REMiBE
Washington: Character of Property Acquired Under Installment
Purchase Contract. The ubiquitous installment purchase contract,
under which the vendor retains title pending payment of the purchase
price, creates problems of analysis in the community property field as
well as in other areas of the law. In the recent case of Fritch v. Fritch,'
the Washington court held that land purchased during marriage under
such a contract belonged to the community although prior to receiving
a deed to the premises half of the payments were made out of the husband's separate funds. Before examining the exact factual pattern before the court in the Fritch case, some of the concepts involved in
determining the community or separate character of ownership should
be considered, as well as certain Washington cases applying these concepts to property purchased under installment purchase contracts.
Although all property acquired during marriage presumably belongs
to the community,2 a spouse may overcome this presumption by showing that the property was acquired either by gift, devise, descent, or
with the rents, issues or profits of separate property.' The property
acquired takes on the same character as the property used for its
acquisition.' Because of the rule that the character of property is
fixed at the "time of acquisition,"5 the community or separate nature
of the funds used or credit extended at that time would determine the
character of ownership which is not affected by later payments made
on the purchase price.'
153 Wn.2d 496, 335 P.2d 43 (1959).
In re Sanderson's Estate, 118 Wash. 250, 203 Pac. 75 (1922) ; Conley v. Moe, 7
Wn.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941) ; Rawlings v. Heal, 11 Wash. 219, 190 Pac. 237 (1920) ;
the presumption obtains whether title is taken in the name of the husband or wife.
Patterson v. Bowes, 78 Wash. 476, 139 Pac. 225 (1914).
3 RCW 26.16.010 and RCW 26.16.020 define separate property as property owned
before marriage and that acquired after marriage by gift, devise, or descent, and the
rents, issues and profits thereof. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lee, 58 Wash. 16,
107 Pac. 870 (1910) ; Chapman v. Bain, 117 Wash. 665, 202 Pac. 245 (1921) ; Rawlings
v. Heal, supra note 2.
4 I; re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919) ; Folsom v. Folsom, 106
Wash. 315, 179 Pac. 847 (1919) ; Woods v. Naimy, 69 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1934).
5In re Madsen's Estate, 48 Wn.2d 675, 296 P.2d 518 (1956) ; In re Witte's Estate,
21 Wn.2d 112, 150 P.2d 595 (1944) ; Sievers v. Sievers, 11 Wn.2d 446, 119 P.2d 668
(1942).
6In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919) ; In re Woodburn's
Estate, 190 Wash. 141, 66 P.2d 1138 (1937).
2
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In the case of an outright conveyance of real property upon a down
payment with a mortgage back to secure the balance of the purchase
price, the "time of acquisition" is easily fixed at the time the deed is
executed. To characterize the nature of the property so acquired the
nature of the funds used for the down payment and the obligation
undertaken for the balance must first be determined.' If the down
payment is made with separate funds and the grantor looks solely to
the separate credit of one of the spouses for payment of the purchase
price, the separate nature of the land is fixed when the deed is executed, even though community funds are later used to discharge the
separate purchase obligation.'
However, in the case of an installment purchase contract under which
the vendor retains title until the last payment is made, there has been
some confusion in Washington as to the method of determining the
character of property acquired. As has been pointed out, the exact
point in time at which a thing is deemed to be acquired as well as the
exact nature of the acquiring property are crucial in determining its
separate or community character. Is the property deemed acquired
when the contract is entered into, bit by bit as the payments are made,
or when the deed is executed? Is the acquiring property the initial purchase obligation and contract right, the funds expended in making payments, or the last payment made when the deed was executed? The
Washington court has tussled with these questions involving installment purchases in the following cases.
In re Kuhn's Estate9 dealt with a land purchase contract entered
into during marriage in which a down payment of one fourth the purchase price was made with community funds. Following the wife's
death, the husband paid the balance of the purchase price and received
a deed to the premises. The court held the realty to be the separate
property of the husband, allowing the wife's estate to recoup an amount
equal to one half of the original community down payment. The court
fixed the "time of acquisition" at the time the deed was executed, and,
reasoning from the proposition that an executory contract of sales creates no title, legal or equitable, in the vendee, held that the community
had acquired no interest in the realty. The purchase contract was a
community asset which could have been considered the source used in
7 Bryant v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 Pac. 931 (1894).
s In re Finn's Estate, supranote 6. For a discussion of the "time of acquisition" test

as applied to various purchase transactions see Cross, The Community Property Law
in Washington, 15 LA. L. REv. 315 (1955).
9 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925).
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acquiring title.'" Likewise, the pro-proprietary interest in the land might
have been based on the source of funds used, as one fourth of the payments were made with community funds. However, due to the repudiation of the doctrine of equitable conversion" in prior cases, the court
treated the contract interest as distinct from the title question. The
property not having been acquired during marriage, recovery was limited to reimbursement for the deceased spouse's share of community
payments at the time of her death."
In a later case, In re Binge's Estate,' a dispute arose as to the community or separate character of land purchased under an installment
purchase contract entered into by the husband when single, although
the final payments were made and the deed executed after marriage.
The opinion treated the subject of acquisition through installment payments at some length and announced the following rule:
Property acquired through contractual obligation, as between husband

and wife and all others claiming under them, has its origin and is acquired as of the date when the obligation becomes binding, and not as
of the time when the money is paid or the thing is delivered or conveyed. The fruit of the obliqation is legally acquired as of the date
when the obligation becomes binding.14 [fEmphasis added.]

At first blush, the rule as stated would appear to overrule the Kuhn
case as to "time of acquisition" and thus obliterate the distinction between purchases under executory installment contracts and purchase
money mortgages. The purchase obligation involved in the Binge case
was clearly the separate obligation of the husband, he having contracted when single, but the above rule was not literally applied as the
court went on to investigate the nature of the contract payments made
in passing upon the extent of the community and separate interests in
the property.
The court found the land to be the separate property of the husband not on the basis of the separate character of the purchase obligation but on the wife's failure to overcome the presumption that the
separate obligation was paid out of separate funds. 5 The reason for
10 In the case of Norman v. Levenhagen, 142 Wash. 372, 253 Pac. 113 (1927), the
court recognized that an executory contract for the purchase of realty was personal
property capable of community or separate ownership.
11 Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
12 The amount awarded could also have represented one half the value of the purchase contract at the time of death.
13 5 Wn.2d 446, 105 P.2d 689 (1940).
14 Id. at 484.
15 Where the husband has in his possession both community and separate funds, the
presumption is that he pays debts from the fund from which properly they should be
met. In re Finn's Estate, 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919).
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the investigation into the payments made stemmed from a statement

in the case to the effect that the community payment factor may make
of the property something other than "rents, issues and profits" of
separate property, although "when it is made to appear that property
was once of a separate character, it will be presumed that it maintains
that character until some direct and positive evidence to the contrary

is made to appear.""
The somewhat perplexing rule of the Binge case was again referred

to by the court in the case of In re Doughertys Estate7 in which furniture was purchased under a conditional sales contract entered into
by the wife before marriage, although the final payments were made
and title acquired after marriage. After stating that the rule in the
Binge case controlled and that property is acquired as of the time the

obligation becomes binding, the court proceeded to prorate the proprietary interests therein according to the community or separate na-

ture of the funds used in making payments, thus seemingly applying
a source of funds test. The wife, having made community payments
on the purchase price, a corresponding interest in the property was
found to belong to the community.
The rule in most community property jurisdictions is that property
purchased through installment payments partakes of the same character as the initial purchase obligation irrespective of the time legal
title is actually acquired." To the extent that funds from a different
source are used in making payments, the property so purchased is frequently subjected to an equitable lien for reimbursement in favor of
the community or the spouse out of whose funds such payments are
made." Although this rule appeared to be stated in the Binge case,
the court indicated that it did not operate to fix irrevocably the entire
proprietary nature of the property being purchased at the time of
the contracting, but rather to create a presumption that the property
so acquired would follow that of the initial contract interest. This contract interest is the acquired property which presumably retains its

1 lit re Binge's Estate, 5 Wn.2d 446, 485, 105

P.2d 689 (1940).
27 Wn2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947).
isSee 1 DE FUNIAiK, Commu NTY PROPERTY § 64 (1948); Evans v. Ingram, 288
17

S.W. 494 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926) ; error refused; Commissioner v. King, 69 F.2d 639 (5th
Cir. 1934) ; Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1945). California, however, prorates ownership in accordance with the nature of the payments made. Vieux v.
Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 Pac. 640 (1926). This is the method used in Washington
in determining ownership of life insurance policies.
10 Baker v. Baker, 209 La. 1041, 26 So. 2d 132 (1946) : The doctrine that the legal
title may be subject to certain equities is recognized in Washington. Conley v. Moe,
7 Wn.2d 355, 110 P.2d 172 (1941) ; Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 Pac. 130 (1904).
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original community or separate nature in the absence of some "direct
and positive evidence to the contrary."2 Just what constitutes such
evidence to the contrary is not entirely clear. The Binge case indicated that if the wife had shown that community payments were in fact
made on the husband's separate purchase obligation, a corresponding
community interest in the realty would have been found. In the Dougherty case the fact that the community payments made by the wife on
her separate obligation were clearly traced and identified resulted in
prorating ownership of the furniture acquired in accordance with the
payments made. The payments in the above cases were made by the
spouse initially owning the contract interest, and the question remains
whether a mere identification of the source of funds used would overcome the presumption when payments are made without the consent
of the owner of the initial contract interest.
The recent case of Fritch v. Fritch2" indicated that the ability to
show that separate funds were in fact used in making payments on an
installment purchase contract initially belonging to the community will
not necessarily operate to create a separate interest therein. The case
involved a dispute over land undisposed of in a divorce decree. The
land was purchased under an installment contract entered into during
marriage, the deed having been placed in escrow pending payment of
the purchase price. The husband paid the balance of the purchase
price and received a deed to the premises about the same time as the
entry of the interlocutory divorce decree and a year after the parties
had separated dividing their household goods and other personal property. Twelve years after the final decree was entered, the land having
substantially increased in value, the ex-wife asserted a claim to a onehalf interest in the property as tenant in common. Although the court
found that the husband paid one-half of the purchase price from his
separate funds, it was held that the property belonged to the community at the time of the divorce although not disposed of by the final
decree. In upholding the ex-wife's claim, however, the court impressed
her interest in the land with an equitable lien for reimbursement of
one half the purchase payments made from the husband's separate
funds.
As the husband's principal argument in the above case was based
on adverse possession, the exact basis for finding the disputed land to
20 See also Morse v. Johnson, 88 Wash. 57, 152 Pac. 677 (1915) ; Guye v. Guye, 63
Wash. 340, 115 Pac. 731 (1911).
21

Supra note 1.
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have belonged to the community is not set forth in the opinion. If the
approach seemingly adopted in the Binge and Dougherty cases was
followed, i.e., that the fruit of the purchase contract partakes of the
separate or community nature of the initial contract interest in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the holding
indicates that some type of consent, actual or implied, of the contract
owner is necessary to overcome this presumption. Thus a husband cannot unilaterally acquire a separate interest in a community contract
by making payments thereon out of his separate funds.2 This consent can be implied when, as in the Binge and Dougherty cases, the
spouse making community payments on a separate contract is the
owner of the initial contract interest. Likewise, community payments
on a separate contract may be found to create interests therein if it
can be shown there were no separate funds available.
The decision in the Fritch case could likewise furnish support for a
future application of the rule stated, but apparently not followed, in
the Binge and Dougherty cases, i.e., that the character of property is
fixed at the time the purchase obligation becomes binding. Such an
approach would remove the distinction in Washington between property acquired through installment purchase contracts and purchase
money mortgages.
Although the Fritclh case would support both of the above methods
of determining ownership of property acquired through installment
payments, the holding clearly indicates a rejection of a strict "source
of funds" approach suggested in the Binge and Dougherty cases and
thus throws some light on a rather confusing area of Washington community property law.
ToNi C. REMBE
22

In the usual case it can be presumed that separate payments made by the husband

on a community contract were intended as a gift to the community.

